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1. INTRODUCTION 
Concern for future generations often prompts the idea that present generations have 
certain duties to future people. These duties are explained sometimes in terms of rights 
that future persons have against persons in the present. This poses a challenge to the 
very nature of rights in the light of the fact that the context is necessarily time-related. 
The main problem at hand, arising from a rights-based approach to the relations 
between non-necessarily-overlapping generations, according to which time creates a 
distance between moral agents and the persons affected by their actions, is that a certain 
duty can be binding at a different moment in time than its correlative right. The duty O 
existing at moment t1 correlates with right R, existing at moment t2; at t1, O is present 
and actual, whereas R is future and possible; but at t2, R is present and actual. How can 
this be? Is R the same right at t1 and t2, albeit with different properties? Is R a scattered 
object in time with regard to O, just as certain objects can be scattered in space and yet 
maintain a specific unity? Or is it possible that R at t1 is a totally distinct normative 
reality from R at t2? Or can this all be utter nonsense and there is no such thing as rights 
of future persons? 
There seem to be compelling reasons against attributing such rights to future 
persons. The ‘nonexistence’ argument states that future persons cannot have rights 
because they do not exist (De George 1981; Macklin 1981, 151-6; Beckerman 2006); 
and the ‘no-satisfaction’ argument claims that future persons cannot have rights to 
resources that do not exist at the time of their existence because such rights could not be 
satisfied (De George 1981; Beckerman and Pasek 2001). However, the most important 
argument – because it presupposes the aforementioned arguments and proposes to add a 
final death blow – is the much discussed Non-Identity Problem (hereafter NIP), 




(1979), Gregory Kavka (1981), and, most forcefully, Derek Parfit (1987), which poses a 
challenge for any view on which members of present generations would have duties to 
future persons whose existence and identity are contingent upon present decisions, but 
whose lives would be unavoidably flawed in some way. A recent and growing body of 
literature has tried to solve or circumvent the NIP in order to preserve the idea that 
future persons have rights. 
This paper aims at answering some of the objections to the NIP’s criticism of the 
idea of rights of future persons. Those objections usually adopt different perspectives 
depending on how they understand differently the nature of the correlativity between 
rights and duties – some adopt a present-rights-of-future-persons view, others a future-
rights-of-future-persons view, others a transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view, 
and others still an eternalist view of rights and persons. The following pages will try to 
show that only a non-transitive present-rights-of-present-persons view can survive the 
challenges posed by the notion of correlativity inherent in the NIP. 
 
2. THE NIP 
Derek Parfit’s reasoning about the NIP is as follows: which particular future 
persons will exist is dependent on when their procreation takes place; even if we could 
suppose that following certain actions or policies would make future persons worse off, 
the fact remains that the people born as a result of these actions or policies would not 
have been born at all if an alternative action or policy had been adopted; therefore, 
assuming they have lives worth living, they are not harmed by those actions or policies 
(Parfit 1987, 351-79). Since present persons’ allegedly harmful actions or policies will 
also influence the identity of future persons, there is a sense in which future persons 
could not meaningfully be said to be harmed, and even less wronged. And, if they 
cannot be harmed, what would rights protect them against? Imagine a future individual 
who is entitled to a right R but will not be born unless R is violated. If R remains 
unviolated, there is no possible world in which she could exist. So, either it is 
impossible to respect her right or she cannot have a right in the first place; the NIP 
assumes the awkwardness of having to do X for her as a content of R only in worlds in 




The NIP’s challenge to a rights-based approach to relations between non-
necessarily-overlapping generations is based upon a set of fundamental characteristics 
concerning (i) the metaphysics of time and modality, (ii) the language of rights, and (iii) 
a person-affecting morality. 
The basic metaphysical assumptions that underpin the NIP derive from Parfit’s 
Time-Dependence Claim and his genetic essentialism. 
The Time-Dependence Claim: If any particular person had not been conceived 
within a month of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would in fact 
never have existed. (Parfit 1987, 352) 
The Origin View: each person has this distinctive necessary property: that of 
having grown from the particular pair of cells from which this person in fact 
grew. (Parfit 1987, 352)
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Together, both claims emphasize a connection between personal identity and 
time. This connection contextualizes the relations between present persons and future 
persons in such a way that present actions can affect both the number and the identities 
of future persons. The moral status of such actions will be determined by narrow 
person-affecting principles (PAP) stating that an action is wrong only if it harms and 
that it harms iff it brings about a state of affairs that makes someone worse off (Parfit 
1987, 396; Temkin 2012).  
The combination of such claims reflects a specific metaphysical standpoint with 
regard to time and modality. Firstly, it expresses a commitment to the view that 
temporally-present objects actually exist and that future individuals are actually 
nonexistent qua future individuals.
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 In the metaphysics of modality, the soundness of 
the NIP relies on there being possible future worlds in which particular individuals may 
or not exist depending on present actions or policies; and the comparative function of 
the PAP between an actual world and counterfactual worlds depends also upon 
possible-worlds semantics. This means that there are different senses of existence, 
depending on whether an individual belongs to an actual necessary world or to a 
possible future world. Whatever is solely in the future is actually nonexistent except if 




Secondly, the NIP is underpinned by the idea of an Open Future, wherein 
present possible and different actions may produce future and different outcomes, all of 
which are possible. This involves conceiving of time in a branching rather than linear 
system into the future at any given time t. Open future is the tense dimension of 
Possibilism. Possibilism is a form of nondeterminism in accordance with a metaphysics 
of modality characterized in terms of individuals existing across a specified range of 
possible worlds. When present actions affect future people, PAP requires that we 
consider the different possible people who might later be actual or not. Present people 
can choose different possible actions and compare their possible outcomes; and this is 
what justifies commendations and regrets because there is always something else that 
could have been done instead (Parfit 2011, 464-75). Possibilism opposes broad versions 
of actualism, which permit no properties to hold of a nonexistent at a possible world and 
always understand the words ‘there are’ and ‘exists’ in the same single sense; likewise, 
possibilism opposes modal realism, the view that all possible worlds exist and that our 
world is only one possible way for a world to be actual, that is, whenever such-and-such 
might be the case, there is some world where such-and-such is the case.
3
 Instead, 
possibilism requires that future worlds remain possible in the present and that at least 
one of them will become actual, which is different from stating that nothing merely 
possible cannot exist or that possible worlds are already actual in their own way.
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With regard to the language of rights subject to the NIP, even though there is a 
wide margin of choice in terms of content, the formal nature of the normative 
instrument seems undisputed. Rights concerning members of future generations are 
normative reasons against the actions and policies available to members of present 
generations. Rights-language in this context follows the basic formula  
(1) A has a right to X against B 
or 
(2) RabX. 
There is a right-holder, A (the subject of the right); X is the object of the right; 
B, the respondent or addressee of the right. Regardless of what X stands for, the nature 
of the relation between A and B can be easily established. A has a claim against B, who 




between a holder, a respondent, and an object. This implies the existence of correlative 
duties and an emphasis on the passive dimension of rights – there is no relevant purpose 
in using a language of rights in the context of relations between non-necessarily-
overlapping generations if it does not aim at justifying the existence of some normative 
constraints on the actions of present people. In Hohfeldian terms, they are mostly claim-
rights (as against liberties, powers, and so forth), in that they are justified entitlements to 
the carrying out of correlative duties, positive or negative. They cannot be strictly active 
rights (a freedom, that is, being entitled to X if one chooses, and not being required not 
to do X) because that would require a concern with one’s own actions, which in turn 
requires exercisability, existence and actuality. 
Such a broad conception of rights can be supported both by interest theories and 
by will-theories of rights. According to the interest theories, a person is said to have a 
right whenever the protection or advancement of some interest of hers is recognized as a 
reason for imposing duties on others; the interest of the future person A is the value 
determining the content of X, which can then be opposed to B. Will theories, however, 
single out right-holders in virtue of the power they have over the duty in question; since 
this involves zones of freedom to be granted only to those able to exercise such powers, 
and future persons have no actual power per se, will-theories of rights seem less open to 
attributing rights to not-yet-existing persons. However, in Parfit’s reasoning, the NIP 
evolves into the waiver argument: when a person A realizes that the only way to have 
avoided the harm she suffered is to never have been born in the first place, as long as 
her life is worth living, she will accept the action that caused such a harm; her lack of 
regret is an implicit waving of her right (Parfit 1987, 364-6). The rights in question are 
not inalienable, even if they are conceived as counterfactuals; in this non-actualist sense, 
they can cohere with a will-theory of rights. 
The criterion of morality underlying the NIP consists in a counterfactual PAP. In 
the light of this, wrongness is not determined by a violation of some objective values, 
but rather by the circumstance that some person is wronged; and a person is said to be 
wronged by the conduct of another if she has been harmed as a result of the relevant 
conduct. In addition, that person is harmed if she is left worse off than she otherwise 
would have been. According to the NIP, if being brought into existence is neither a 
benefit nor a harm, then someone is not made worse off by being brought into existence 




comparing possible would-have-been worlds. Such a person-affecting frame of 
reference fits into the rights-language almost perfectly because it allows for a rights-
centred interpretation of what it means to be harmed. 
 
3. THE NIP’S INDEFEASIBILITY 
Reactions to the NIP are myriad. Some simply bite the bullet and accept the 
soundness of the non-identity argument by claiming that it is possible neither to 
genuinely harm persons who depend on present choices for their very existence nor to 
violate rights that never actually exist; but they reject that this poses a moral problem 
since even what seems like an implausible conclusion regarding possible future persons 
(for instance, that it is not morally wrong to conceive a blind child even if the same 
agents could have conceived a sighted child) is more consonant with common-sense 
morality than one might think (Boonin 2014). The remaining reactions to the NIP have 
different perspectives on what is at stake in a rights-based approach to moral relations 
between non-necessarily-overlapping generations.  
Those that deny the NIP’s bullet usually adopt a present-rights-of-future-persons 
view. They might even admit that it is a necessary condition for a right to be violated 
that someone bearing that right actually exists; but they refuse to acknowledge that the 
present nonexistence of particular future persons is an impediment to the attribution of 
rights.
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 Those that try to dodge the NIP’s bullet by attacking at least one of its basic 
features – its metaphysics of time and modality, its language of rights or its person-
affecting morality – tend to adopt a future-rights-of-future-persons view. And those 
who favour a static conception of time that deems them eternalists
6
 even go so far as to 
adopt an actual-present-rights-of-actual-future-persons view.  
The difference between these views follows from different ways of perceiving 
the nature of correlativity between duties and rights inherent in the debate. The present-
rights-of-future-persons view requires that present duties with present bearers are 
correlative with present rights with future holders; the future-rights-of-future-persons 
view requires that present duties with present bearers are correlative with future rights 




be correlative with any rights with any holders at any existing time. Each perspective is 
subject to different problems. 
 
3.1. Present-rights-of-future-persons view 
Suppose there is a present duty O to a future person A. 
 
Rights-based approaches to the NIP agree that O at t1 has a bearer B (the subject 
of the duty) who is supposed to perform X, being X the object of a correlative right, R; 
they also agree that A at t2 is the holder of a right, whose object is similar to X. But, in 
cases in which B does not exist at t2 and in which A does not exist at t1, they disagree 
about whether R can exist at t1 and, if so, whether it is actually the same right held by A 
at t2.  
The present-rights-of-future-persons view understands R to exist and be binding 
to B both at t1 and at t2, the only difference between both moments consisting simply in 
the actualization of the holder at t2 who was merely conditional at t1. The future-rights-
of-future-persons view, on the other hand, understands that R at t1 is not the same right 
held by A at t2; for the purposes of distinguishing them, let us call R1 to R at t1 and R2 to 
R at t2. The correlative of O at t1 is not R2 since R2 only has binding force at t2, where B 
no longer exists; thus, either O at t1 has no correlative right or, if it has, R1 has no holder 
whatsoever and no binding force to B at t1. As for eternalists, since they believe that t1 
and t2 are both equally actual, they have no problem with considering that the 
correlative of R2 is O, and vice-versa. 
Supposing that all relevant duties in this context necessarily correlate with 
rights, what are the characteristics of R1 at t1 (Rt1bt1X)? Firstly, it has no particular 
holders. This means that (i) it is not exercisable directly; (ii) it is not an actual deontic 




associated with actual persons.
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 Secondly, R1’s rationale or background justification, Y, 
that is, the reason for having a right with binding force on others, consists of the 
interests of A assessed at t1. Y is also the background justification of O insofar as it 
coincides with the interest-or-will of B. The correlative bindingness of O and R1 is 
based on a value relation between the right-holder and the duty-bearer. B’s duty to X is 
directed to A if there is a reason to favour A’s ‘interest-that-B-does-X’ over B’s 
‘interest-or-will-that-she-does-not-X’, and that reason justifies O at t1. Thirdly, R1’s 
effects consist in the actual bindingness of B to X at t1, which means that any violation 
of the contents of O (either not performing what is demanded in X or performing what 
is forbidden in X, for instance, conservation or depletion) is an infringement of R1 
already at t1. So, the right correlative with O at t1 is a claim-right held by a person who 
will exist only at t2, protective of her interests, but it is not a deontic power per se albeit 
constituting the normative grounds of O. 
Conversely, what are the characteristics of R2, at t2 (Rat2bt1X)? Firstly, it has a 
particular human bearer, A. This person may be said to have a legitimate claim for 
reparations whenever Y at t2 is harmed causally by X or non-X, which means that she 
has an actual deontic power, based on her actual will and which protects her specific 
interests. Secondly, this will and these interests are assessed at t2 and they form the core 
basis of Y – it is the actual will and interests of A at t2 that determine Y, not the fact that 
they can be tokens of the general contents of Y at t1. Thus, Y at t2 differs in content 
from Y at t1, which means that it is not necessarily coincidental with B’s interest-or-
will. Similarly, this Y is not the background justification of an O at t1, but only of an O 
at t2. Thirdly, R2’s effects consist in Y not being damaged at t2 or, if so, repaired as a 
result of X. This means that it is a deontic power and a claim-right liable to satisfaction. 
Conversely, the protection or reparation of Y at t2 seems to be incumbent upon 
persons existing at t2. However, X at t1 aimed at protecting Y at t1, that is, the interests 
of future persons assessed at t1; if X at t2 aims at protecting Y at t2, then the contents of 
X have changed into the actual will and interests of present persons assessed at t2. Both 
the bearers and the object of the duty correlative with R2 seem to be different from the 
bearers and the object of O at t1. 
Overall, the essential characteristics of the correlativity between duty and right 




based on there being holders in the future. The background justification of such 
correlatives at t1 is that they are rights of future persons qua future persons. R2, on the 
other hand, is at t2 a right of a present person. Its holder, its binding force, its effects are 
different from R1 at t1 – A does not exist at t1, but B does not exist at t2, and both X and 
Y at t1 are different from X and Y at t2. In addition, at t1, R2 cannot be satisfied; and at 
t2, R1 cannot be satisfied with regard to A. The satisfaction of O’s correlative at t1 seems 
to be different from the satisfaction of R2 at t2.  
Such differences make it hard to sustain that R1 and R2 are the same right at 
different moments. This endangers the present-rights-of-future-persons view. 
 
3.2. The modal realist view 
The same problems on the nature of correlativity at different times also affect 
those attempts to circumvent the NIP by substituting possibilism with modal realism 
(Wrigley 2012)
8
. Suppose that, in accordance with counterpart theory, any given 
possible world exists, and for every right-holder A in world W there is a counterpart of 
A in possible worlds that, albeit somewhat similar, are not W. In a branching system, it 
would resemble the following. 
 
In world W at t1, there are several possible future worlds. Each of these worlds 




counterparts of A exist at t2, for instance, A1, A2, A3 and A4. The nonexistence and the 
non-satisfaction arguments that support the NIP are then overcome. 
However, if modal realism accepts a branching system at t1, it will also have to 
admit that at t1 world W has more than two futures; if two futures equally pertain to the 
same world, and in one of them there will be A whereas in the other there will not be A, 
the existence of both worlds will make it both that A will exist and not exist in W, 




In divergence, there is no overlap between worlds with regard to their past. Like 
in the branching system, there are also many futures in divergence, that is, many later 
segments of worlds that begin by duplicating initial segments of world W; but since 
only one of these futures is the future of world W, the other futures belong not to W but 
to W’s other-worldly counterparts (Lewis 1986, 206-7). Thus, the rights of A, A1, A2, 
A3 and A4 never exist equally in W, not even with regard to t1 at W; their correlative 
duties will exist as counterparts of different possible worlds in the present of t1. The 
correlative of O at t1 in world W can be (only) in the future of world W. The problem is 
that, at t1 in W, there is no way of knowing which of the future possible worlds will be 
the actual continuance of W. If A, A1, A2, A3 and A4 all have rights, their correlative 
duties will exist not in the same present world W but in the counterpart present worlds 




that is actual at t1 in W. But since it is impossible to assess which of the future possible 
worlds is privileged with being the actual future of W
9
, even if all rights of A, A1, A2, 
A3 and A4 exist at t2, it makes no sense to compare existent future rights whose 
correlative duties do not belong to the same world. Even if we possessed the magical 
foresight of knowing that A will be the right-holder of O at W, a violation of A’s right 
could not be compared with a violation of A1’s right given that they would involve 
completely different correlative duties (O for A’s right; O1 for A1’s right). So, at t1 in 
W, even if one takes modal realism for granted, O can only be grounded on the fact that 
it will have a non-identifiable correlative right in a possible future – and this subjects 
modal realism to the same difficulties faced by the present-rights-of-future-persons 
view. 
 
3.3. What are future rights? 
Suppose, however, that the rights of future persons should be understood in the 
light of the future-rights-of-future-persons view. While preserving the metaphysical 
context of presentism and possibilism, these are future rights. What is the nature of 
correlativity in such a case? Strictly speaking, O has no correlative at t1, but only at t2; 
inversely, the correlative of R2 at t2 is O at t1. Even though there is simultaneity between 
the right and its holder, there is no simultaneity between the right and its correlative 
duty. 
For will-theories of rights, this version seems difficult to accept. For how can O 
be binding at all if at t1 there is no correlative will justifying it? Interest theories may 
sustain that a duty can be justified by interests that still remain to be seen. But this 
expresses a very specific interpretation of correlativity. 
There are usually two ways by which to express correlativity. 
C1: OR  RO 
C2: OR  RO 
C1 understands correlativity as admitting a prior concept that can function as a 
cause or a reason for a normative instrument. The difference between duty-based and 




at least logically prior to rights: rights arise from two facts about duties, that A does not 
have a duty not to X and that others have a duty not to interfere with A’s X-ing. And 
according to the latter, A has a right to X, and the duty of others not to interfere or to 
fulfil it follows from this, as does the absence of a duty for A not to X. The difference 
between both approaches is mostly epistemological, but it depends on the nature of C1. 
The future-rights-of-future-persons view also depends upon C1 insofar as O at t1 is prior 
to its correlative R at t2. 
C2, on the other hand, understands correlativity as a special kind of logical 
equivalence between two normative elements.
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 A correlative is that in which one 
element of the correlation is inherent in the other element’s essence as its logical 
necessity. One element of the correlation must find its explanation in the other, and vice 
versa; they are conceived of simultaneously, that is, once one is posed there must also 
be the other (also, they cancel one another in such a way that if one is taken away there 
cannot be the other).
11




and vice versa. This strong correlativity expresses the idea that statements about 
claim-rights and statements about relational duties are the same thing, one described 
from A’s perspective, one from B’s. 
Some authors take C2 to be flawed due to the existence of duties that do not 
imply rights (Lyons 1970; MacCormick 1977; Simmonds 1986, 278; Harris 1997, 82). 
But with regard to claim-rights, which form the conceptual backbone of the rights of 
future persons, duties must always be expressed in relational terms. In this sense, C2 is 
utterly incompatible with the future-rights-of-future-persons view since it requires that 
there must be some kind of binding rights existing at t1. If the existence of rights 
remains somehow attached to the idea of personal identity, since A does not exist at t1, 
then O can have no simultaneous correlative. 
Furthermore, when applied to the future-rights-of-future-persons view, C1 




moral relations between non-overlapping generations at t1 since it is O that becomes 
logically prior to R. What is actual at t1 is O, not R. Even in interest-theories of rights, 
the foresighted interests of future persons may explain the reason why there should be 
the grounds for R, but they are not the source of O’s obligatoriness; rather, because O is 
obligatory those interests may be formulated into rights-language later on. The second 
problem is that, in such a case, O has no apparent grounds for being obligatory at t1; or, 
if it has them, they are different from the interests and eventual wills of future persons 
since they cannot be formulated in terms of rights at t1 without the prior existence and 
bindingness of O. 
These problems are best illustrated with an example. Suppose that there are 
duties at t1 for the production and preservation of cans of baby food with remote expiry 
dates. These cans will most likely be consumed by persons who will only exist at t2. A 
future-rights-of-future-persons view following C1 will claim that the best account to 
justify the normative restrictions on the type of food that can be bottled at t1, as well as 
the claim to sue at t2 for damages resulting therefrom, is a reference at t1 to the future 
rights of the baby as a consumer, that is, of baby A at t2.
12
 However, there seems to be a 
difference between saying that specific future rights are strong reasons for explaining 
why there ought to be baby food regulation today and saying that baby food regulation 
is binding only because there will be specific future rights whose objects consist in 
fulfilling today the contents of baby food regulation. If there is no right at t1, there must 
be a difference at t1 between statements of reasons and statements about rights. The 
former are of the kind: 
(3) X is ‘grounded in the value of human life’ 
or 
(4) XY. 
And the latter are of the kind: 






(3) is different from (5) just as (4) is different from (6). The relationship between 
both kinds of statements is mostly justificatory. The reason for a right is one thing; the 
right which is based upon this reason is another. Obviously, the nature of a right cannot 
be explained without an analysis of Y; but Y cannot be the source of R’s bindingness at 
t1 since asking the reason for something somehow presupposes knowledge of the thing 
to be justified. It is neither baby A’s possible right at t1 (because it does not exist) nor 
baby A’s actual right at t2 (because it is neither logically nor chronologically prior to O) 
that constitutes the source of the obligatoriness of baby food regulation at t1. Rather, it is 
the expectation at t1 that there will be consumers at t2 (nonexistent at t1) that justifies 
there being baby food regulation (the reason for the object of O and the reason for the 
object of R2 may be similar), but it is not what brings this regulation about. 
 
3.4. What are future persons? 
The NIP’s main challenge to both views, the present-rights-of-future-persons 
and the future-rights-of-future-persons, consists in questioning the possibility of 
violating future person’s rights given that such a violation would involve the person’s 
nonexistence and consequently the right’s nonexistence. The whole argument relies on 
the assumptions that (i) there will be persons in the future; that (ii) those persons will be 
right-holders; and that (iii) some of their rights can bind us today. These assumptions 
are descriptive of the state of affairs at t2 from the viewpoint of the state of affairs at t1. 
In order for such rights to be binding, it is irrelevant whether such states of affairs are 
true at t2; but it is not possible that they have no truth value at t1 because that is what 
attributes binding force to such rights vis-à-vis members of present generations. At t1, if 
there are rights of future persons, these assumptions have to be necessarily true. 
Still, if these assumptions are understood only by using a conception of rights 
inherently connected with personal identity, the particular persons that will be born in 
the future are not determined necessarily at t1. The identity of right-holder A at t1 is a 
future contingent. This means that at t1 there is an infinite number of future possible 
worlds containing an indeterminate (even possibly infinite) number of individuals who 





From the viewpoint of t1, A, A1, A2, A3 and A4 are not equally future persons. 
Only one of these possible persons at t1 will live at t2, as the future of world W in which 
t1 is actual – only one of them will be an actual person in W (at t2), which means that 
only one of them is a future person at t1. The remaining possible persons are only 
‘hypothetically actual’, or ‘futurible persons’.13 So, with regard to the future, there are 
three kinds of persons: futurible persons, that is, all persons whose existence at t2 is 
merely possible at t1; future persons, that is, the futurible persons at t1 who will actually 
exist at t2; and particular persons in the future, that is, the actual persons that live at t2. 
The right-holder A is a particular person; but at t1, particular persons existing at t2 are in 
themselves unidentifiable. This conclusion follows from the NIP. As it happens, future 
persons are also unidentifiable at t1. Whether the answer to discerning the truth of future 
contingents is that there is no special future branch in the tree of possibilities deserving 
to be called the true future (Thomason 1970); or that all future contingents are false 
(Todd 2016); or that future contingents have no chronicle-independent truth-values in 
the present (Aristotle 2002; De interpretatione, 18b23ff); or that some function helps to 
determine where the thin red line will stretch (Belnap and Green 1994); it is not 
reasonable to assume that at t1 a statement identifying a future person can be true. 
A rights-approach to moral duties towards members of future generations that 
takes identity seriously should then more accurately talk about the rights of futurible 
persons since those are the only ones that can be identified at t1. Rights-talk about future 




without any need for them to be somehow identifiable or expectable at t1 – a strategy 
that involves taking personal identity out of the equation and raises entirely different 
problems, as will be seen in the fololowing section. However, the adoption of a futurible 
persons terminology entails assuming at t1 that there is some normative relevance and 
influence of rights that will never become actual, given that not all futurible persons will 
become actual persons. The difficulty in ascertaining which of the futurible persons at t1 
is at t1 the future person that will be a particular person at t2 puts all futurible persons on 
an equal footing. At this level, all (futurible) rights are contingent. It is equally possible 
at t1 that the futurible person A1 will exist and that she will not exist. A duty O exists 
therefore at t1 not simply towards a future person, but towards futurible persons 
assessed at t1; and this duty correlates equally with the rights of A, A1, A2, A3 and A4. 
Since only one of these futurible persons is the (unknown) future person, there seem to 
be duties at t1 correlating with rights of persons that will never exist. Even though it is 
reasonable to talk of the rights of future persons, the fact that at t1 all the rights in the 
future belong to futurible persons seems to invalidate rights-talk at t1. 
 
3.5. Can personal identity be taken out of the equation? 
Removing personal identity from the language of rights overcomes the problem 
of futurible human rights-holders. One way of attempting it is to disconnect particular 
human identities from the concept of a person. In this case, the notion of personhood is 
strictly normative, independent of actual flesh-and-blood human individuals. Rights are 
assigned to persons (natural or artificial), not humans; human individuals have rights 
because they acquire the status of personhood, not the other way round. Human rights 
are tokens of the personal rights of humanity as a whole; they are the properties of 
human individuals because human individuals share the normative properties inherent 
in being a member of humanity. In this sense, rights are attributed to types, of which 
particular future persons will be mere tokens (Fieser 1992; Herstein 2009; Unruh 2016). 
However, even if we set aside Carl Schmitt’s famous dictum that ‘whoever invokes 
humanity wants to cheat’ (Schmitt 1996, 54), different levels of abstraction concerning 
the subjects of these rights create new problems. 
Another way of attempting to take personal identity out of the equation is to 




or social roles (Baier 1981) rather than to actual persons. This, however, entails a 
conception of right that is neither subjective nor a deontic power. None of Hohfeld’s 
classes of rights fit into this conception given that they all describe human abilities. In 
the case of status-functions, the non-individualist process is not even complete: a status-
function described as ‘A counts as Y in context C’, in which Y is a function rather than 
a person, holds a right such as ‘Y counts as Rb in context C’, where Rb is a right-holder; 
but since Y can only exist as a status-function given the prior and independent existence 
of A, then attributing rights to Y is the same as stating that 'A counts as YRb in context 
C’; if A is a person that fulfils the function created at Y, particular right-holders are 
inherent in statements about the rights of Y.  
Theorists of functions and roles as subjects of rights might object to this view by 
saying that even if human right-holders are required to create functions and roles, they 
are not particular humans but only types of humans, person-types of which particular 
persons are mere tokens. Person-types are general persons (like ‘the average American’ 
[Parfit 2011, 220]), that is, a group of possible persons, one of whom will be actual. 
However, what is the actual nature of a right of a person-type without a particular 
instantiation? That is, a right of a person-type to which there is still no token? Since 
there is no actuality involved, it is not a deontic power except only potentially, so it is 
neither a claim nor a liberty nor a power. But its correlative duty must be binding on 
present bearers regardless of the instantiation of tokens – that is what makes it a right in 
the first place. It is not a future right because what is future is the token, not the type; so 
it must be a present right without holders.  
There are several legal experiences that seem to use rights-terminology to 
describe normative instruments without human subjects. For instance, donating an 
estate via testament to an unborn person; an abandoned ticket to tomorrow night’s 
theatre show; a bearer share not physically held by anyone; the rights to an estate left in 
an inheritance not yet accepted. In such cases, the formula RabX is valid but non-
performative either because A is an empty quantifier from the viewpoint of actuality (a 
type without tokens) or because A is an absolute quantifier from the viewpoint of 
possibility (it includes the class of all futurible tokens). Contrarily, a duty to X on 
account of A may be performative if rendered into a non-relational formula such as 
ObX, to which A is the background justification of the duty rather than its addressee. 




could be that nobody, or that some third party, has the right. O is here a two-point 
operator referring to the relation between a subject and an action, but not to the relation 
between two different normative subjects. Rights-terminology associated to such cases 
seems more metaphorical than otherwise; it makes sense in order to justify why X must 
be normatively protected given that it is expected that X will become the object of 
actual rights in the future; but that is still one long step away from claiming that X is the 
object of an actual right in the present. Similarly, the person-type in the present-rights-
of-future-persons view does not seem to be constitutive of the actual obligatoriness of X 
for B, even if it may be a strong reason for why such a duty should exist. 
Non-individualist theorists of rights endeavour to avoid these problems of types-
without-tokens by claiming that the actual subjects of rights are collective entities, such 
as future generations (Weiss 1990; Kramer 2001; Brännmark 2016; Schuessler 2016, 
91-2).
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 This may avoid part of the NIP since it dismisses personal identities. But it does 
not avoid the problems of correlativity. Generational rights can be approached from a 
present-rights-of-future-generations view or from a future-rights-of-future-generations 
view. In the first instance, even if we concede that they can actually correlate with 
present duties, what grounds them is still the fact that they assemble a set of prospective 
interests of future generations qua future generations; but the future as future is never 
actual; the rights that actual generations in the future will have cannot correlate with 
present duties since the correlatives of the latter (qua future) can never be satisfied 
towards any actual generations. In the second instance, if such future rights are to be 
binding on present generations they already have to exist as strong correlatives with 
those duties in the present – which, of course, they do not. 
Other non-individualist theorists might take abstraction to yet a higher level by 
referring to generic rights (Gewirth 1978). In this case, it makes no difference whether 
right-holders are present or future; what matters is that each right demands the creation 
of the proximate conditions of action of its holder. A claim about a person’s right is 
implicit in every one of that person’s actions. The justification of the right is part of the 
right-norm itself. These rights are generic in the sense that their holders are 
intersubstitutable. Their generic nature supposedly dissolves the NIP because it makes 
duties specifically independent of the existence of particular future persons (Beyleveld 
et al. 2015). Following the NIP, a future person A’s right cannot be compared with a 




consistency say that it is possible to compare actions that deprive future persons of 
generic rights with actions that do not deprive future persons of generic rights; and this 
even applies to futurible persons. 
The correlative terms of generic rights follow from the principle of generic 
consistency, according to which every agent, even the purely self-interested, must 
accept on pain of contradiction that she has rights to the proximate conditions of her 
actions; and this requires that she must accept that all other agents equally have these 
rights since they are part of the condition of being human. This can be somewhat 
problematic if they are regarded as generic duties. Like generic rights, such duties do 
not seem to have particular bearers – they include universal quantification of any given 
person (intersubstitutable) capable of acting for the protection of generic rights. 
However, in the light of the principle of generic consistency, a person can only have the 
conditions for acting if her generic rights are recognized; and recognition of such rights 
is the object of the correlative generic duties. A chicken-and-egg kind of dilemma arises 
here: Person B’s obligation to recognize generic rights depends upon there being a 
particular obligation to recognize her rights as particular instances of generic rights. So, 
what comes first: her particular rights that are instances of generic rights? or the generic 
rights to which her particular rights are instances? In either case, the bindingness of 
rights to members of present generations always seems to involve some kind of 
instantiation or particularization of right-holders (there cannot be any particular duty-
bearers that are not already right-holders in this sense). The argument for generic rights, 
then, is not completely dismissive of the need to associate rights-language to personal 
identity. 
 
3.6. How are such rights infringed? 
The NIP endorses a principle of linear identity, in which an individual A is 
identified in all possible worlds if her necessary properties are identical to those of the 
actual world. If the future individual A were said to be contingently harmed but 
necessarily a female, that would amount to say that there could have been an unharmed 
individual A but not a male individual A that would be the same individual as that one. 
Genetic essentialism, however, entails that there will be no possible world where A has 




any genetic characteristics different from the ones she actually has. The principle of 
linear identity requires that A exists only in one world rather than having some kind of 
transworld identity (in which individual A exists as A in more than one possible world) 
or branching identities. 
In a rights-based approach, any temporally-non-overlapping notion of harm 
consists in an actual violation of rights. Several consequences follow from this frame of 
reference. Firstly, wrongness is determined by a rights-violation, so it cannot be 
independent of a person-affecting state of affairs.
15
 Secondly, any violation of the rights 
of A is also a violation of the principle of linear identity insofar as the rights of A 
depend upon personal identity. In this context, it seems irrelevant whether or not all 
actions and policies performed at t1 influence necessarily or probabilistically the 
identities of all or only a few persons who will live at t2
16
 – what matters is whether 
those actions and policies performed at t1 which violate rights at t2 preserve or not the 
principle of linear identity. According to the NIP, if a violation of the right of A is also a 
violation of the principle of linear identity, then there is no right that could be violated 
in the first place. Conceiving of actions and policies that at t1 do not violate the rights of 
A is the same as fulfilling the principle of linear identity – and here there is no moral 
problem per se. Thirdly, a non-comparative notion of harm that depends solely upon 
someone being in a bad state as a result of an action (Benatar 2006; Harman 2009) 
seems somewhat insufficient because it is also necessary that such a bad state is the 
result of the violation of a right in order for it to be morally relevant.  
But how can rights held by persons in the future be violated? The PAP states that 
there must be some kind of comparison between an actual state of affairs and an 
alternative state of affairs in which there is no harmful action or policy; threshold 
conceptions of harm determine wrongness not by comparing a person’s current 
condition with that in which she would otherwise have been if not for the allegedly 
harmful action, but rather with how she ought to be regardless of the harm done (Hanser 
1990; Shiffrin 1999; McMahan 2001; Harman 2004; Rivera-Lopez 2009)
17
. In rights-
language, however, this distinction is not so clear.  
Suppose there is a person at t2 holding an actual right R2 against B at t1 for the 




resources. How is R2 violated? The relation between R2 and O can give rise to the 
following scenarios. 
(1) B follows the prohibition of depletion at t1 and at t2 no resources are 
depleted. 
(2) B does not follow the prohibition of depletion at t1 and at t2 resources are 
depleted. 
(3) B follows the prohibition of depletion at t1 and yet at t2 resources are 
depleted. 
(4) B does not follow the prohibition of depletion at t1 and yet at t2 no resources 
are depleted. 
Whereas (1) describes the scenario in which R2 is fulfilled, (2) describes the 
scenario in which R2 is violated inasmuch as depletion at t2 is the result of not following 
O at t1. The main problem lies with (3) and (4): Which constitutes a violation of R2? 
That is, which describes a situation in which A is harmed by B?  
According to the threshold conception of harm, the ideal situation is described 
by (1); A is harmed if she is left in a situation different from (1) as a result of the 
violation of O. As it happens, neither (3) nor (4) are descriptive of such a situation: (4) 
expresses the same outcome to A as (1), even if O is not followed; and (3) expresses a 
different outcome to A but which does not follow from the violation of O. However, 
both statements seem to contradict the whole purpose of attributing R2 to A against B, 
for (3) describes a situation in which what is supposed to be protected at t2 is actually 
damaged, whereas (4) describes a situation in which the blatant violation of O~X seems 
disrespectful of that which is protected by R2. On the other hand, it sounds strange to 
claim either that A has been harmed by B because she exists at a time in which 
resources are depleted even though B followed the prohibition of depletion to the 
utmost, or that A has been harmed by B’s violation of the prohibition of depletion even 
though she lives at a time in which resources are not depleted at all.  
The rights-approach to the PAP compares the situation of A in (3) and (4) with 
her situation in the cases in which what seems wrong about (3) and (4) does not happen, 
that is, the cases in which R2 is fulfilled as described in (1). In this sense, there is no 
difference whatsoever between both conceptions of harm given that the ideal situation 




view is the actual non-affecting of R2. However, the PAP compares the actual situation 
of A with all other alternative situations of A, rather than just comparing it with (1). 
This makes it possible to establish a scale of protected values, according to which A is 
worse off at (2) than at (3); also, she is worse off at (3) than at (4); and in (2), (3) and (4) 
she is always worse off than at (1). Borderline cases such as those of (3) and (4) can 
therefore be overcome: except for (1), all other situations may be descriptive of a 
violation of R2 within the context of counterfactuals.  
The PAP seems more effective in identifying violations of the rights of persons 
that exist at t2. The fact that it is in direct contradiction with the principle of linear 
identity when the latter is expressed by means of a language of rights is a further 
argument in support of the NIP. But in either conception of harm in play, it is 
interesting to note that they involve the rights of A at t2, which are actual rights of actual 
persons; strictly at t1, and at t1 alone, there is no available definition of harm being done 
to A, and not even (1) can be stated truly at t1. The violation of rights such as R2 
depends upon there being present rights against past persons (a focus on the moral state 
of affairs at t2) rather than there being present duties to future persons (a focus on the 
moral state of affairs at t1). The discussion of the infringements of rights at t2 is not a 
debate on the rights of future persons per se. 
 
4. EMBRACING THE NIP AND THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS: THE 
PRESENT-RIGHTS-OF-PRESENT-PERSONS VIEW REVISITED 
The soundness of the non-identity argument makes it difficult to talk about the 
rights of future persons. Authors such as Boonin (2014), for instance, fail to see how 
this connotes a moral problem at all. But the thesis that one should embrace rather than 
solve the non-identity argument does not necessarily entail that there is no problem. 
Concern for future generations is a legitimate moral topic that might depend on the 
expectation that future persons will be right-holders. In fact, specific institutions and 
practical proposals aimed at defending the interests and rights of future generations are 
already in play, and this includes the increasing tendency to upgrade such rights to the 
status of constitutional rights.
18
 In addition, the temporal distance between some 
generations increases uncertainty as to the effects of present actions or to the nature of 




generate problems of asymmetry of power across time; the lack of temporal coexistence 
with remote generations is insufficient to remove the interests that present persons may 
have in the interests of future persons. All this is constitutive of a moral problematic to 
which there should be at least a tentative reply. 
There are two kinds of moral replies that embrace the NIP. The first takes rights-
language out of the equation of non-overlapping intergenerational relations, and 
replaces it with principles establishing that something is wrong either in view of 
impersonal effects
19
 or because it contradicts the agents’ reasons, attitudes or intentions 
(Wasserman 2005). Since the NIP’s conception of rights is inherently connected with 
personal identity, this strategy also involves depersonalization, that is, taking future 
personal identity out of the equation. In this setting, there are normative elements 
binding in the present that take into account either the long-term effects of present 
actions or respect for objective values that supposedly are (or should be) shared at all 
times. It is the impersonal moral status of present actions that induces principles and 
constraints justified by what is expected to occur in the future. Such a view constitutes a 
duty-based account of morality which has no rights as correlatives and whose key 
elements resemble what Kant called ‘duties to oneself’ rather than duties-to-others 
(Kant 1996, 385, 395). 
The second kind of reply refuses to rely entirely on a duty-based account of 
intergenerational relations. Rights-language seems so much more axiologically-charged 
when compared to duty-based moral views that it is capable of upgrading the value of 
future interests, thereby attributing stronger reasons or purposes or meaning to present 
duties. But in order to preserve rights-language, it is the future that needs to be taken out 
of the equation, the not-yet-of-personal-identity. Moral intergenerational relations can 
thus be conceived of in terms of rights of living people, whether they are adults with 
present interests in future states of affairs (Mazor 2010), our children or other children 
born in our lifetime (Vanderheiden 2006; Gheaus 2016), any presently existing person 
(Delattre 1972), or any member of temporally neighbouring generations that will at least 
at some point in the future have a chance of overlapping (Gosseries 2008). 
Both replies involve somewhat strange presuppositions. The first grounds a 
depersonalized ethics on the interests of persons, even if they live only in the future. 




exclusively on the present. However, both seem to be legitimate accounts of morality 
that sidestep the NIP – what makes them equally legitimate is the fact that they rely on 
different assumptions concerning the metaphysics of time. 
The depersonalization strategy conceives of the relation between t1 and t2 as a 
present-future kind of temporal order. Within this context, the future comprises the set 
of all intervals beginning at t1 but not including t1 itself; that is, all intervals (including 
t2) beginning immediately after t1 and extending into the indefinite interval. The 
(impersonal) moral principle at t1 is binding only at t1 as actual, regardless of the future 
and independently of any personal rights at any interval. The moment immediately 
succeeding t1 in the order of time assumes then the same characteristics of t1, where the 
same moral principles are binding. Such duties have the appearance of being tenseless 
insofar as their bindingness does not dependent on any correlative normative element 
beyond the present. Contingent sentences at t1 have different truth values than the ones 
potentially assessed for any future interval. This includes moral duties, which are 
equally universal at any moment that shares the characteristics of t1 as actual. They are 
moral principles in the strong sense of a universalizable ethics. 
On the other hand, the present-rights-of-present-persons strategy, which 
preserves rights-language, is not tenseless. The reason why such actual rights at t1 may 
contribute to the solution of moral problems arising only at t2 is that those problems are 
already normatively relevant at t1. Somehow, the truth values of contingent sentences at 
t1 must coincide to a minimum extent with the truth values expected at succeeding 
intervals, including t2. The temporal order no longer displays a distinction between 
present and future, but a sort of ‘semi-future conception of the present’ which comprises 
the set of all intervals beginning at t1 and including t1 itself, as though the present were 
the first moment of the future. Whereas in a present-future temporal order, the truth 
values at t1 of any duty to X are irrelevant to the truth at t1 of the strictly future versions 
of ‘when next’, in the semi-future temporal order if X is true already at t1, then all the 
succeeding intervals are true at t1 if X is true at t1. In this sense, the contents of Y and X 
are coincidental at t1 and t2. In rights-language, this translates into actual rights held by 
actual persons whose bindingness protects interests that they have equally at t1 and at 





Consider a world with three generations (G1, G2, G3), in which G2 overlaps 
with both G1 and G3 but in which G1 never overlaps with G3. Typically, G1 and G2 
overlap at t1, where members of G1 are duty-bearers and members of G2 are right-
bearers; and G2 and G3 overlap at t2, where members of G2 are duty-bearers and 
members of G3 are right-bearers. At t1, the truth value of moral statements of G1 
towards G2 somehow includes the truth value that G2 will have obligations towards G3 
at t2. The rights that correlate with the duties held by members of G1 are held by 
members of G2 at t1, and these rights have at t1 a background justification Y which 
includes an interest in persistence throughout time, a present expectation of overlapping 
coexistence with members of G3. Because the idea of succeeding generations is merely 
an abstraction since it assumes that one entire group of persons departs as another 
arrives on the scene, whereas human population replacement is continuous, the rights of 
any persons born at t1 will have as their object a considerable regard for succeeding 
moments. This does not imply any rights relation between members of G1 and G3, 
neither at t1 nor at t2; but the nature of the rights relation between members of G1 and 
G2 at t1 is based upon a Y that includes the expectation that members of G2 will be 
alive at t2 with the same deontic powers (for instance, they will have to be capable of 
duties) that members of G1 hold at t1.The reason for this equality of treatment is that Y 
for every living person has the same truth value at t1 and at every single moment 
between t1 and t2. Duties and correlative rights between members of different 
generations are therefore always ongoing and actual – it is the temporal persistence of 
the truth values of t1 throughout succeeding moments (whether justified by continuant 
or four-dimensional theories of temporal persistence) that makes such rights and 
correlative duties binding at (and between) t1 and t2. 
Typically, transitive strategies of generational overlap take into consideration the 
interests of remote future generations either by granting to G2 at t1 a right to defend the 
interests of G3 (in consonance with will-theories of rights) or by identifying that G2 has 
an interest in fulfilling its duties to G3 and therefore a corresponding interest in 
preventing G1 from making it heavier for G2 to comply with these duties (in 
consonance with interest-theories of rights) (Gosseries 2008, 461-4). But this strategy 
seems to confuse temporal orders, given that at t1 the interests of G3 exist only as 
interests of G2, which are at t1 present interests of G2 concerning the future. They are 




persisting throughout the succeeding moments of t1 while preserving the same truth 
value. Conversely, the interests of G3 at t1 exist for G1 qua future, not qua semi-future. 
The only way to overcome this difficulty is by narrowing down the temporal scope even 
further, that is, by binding members of G1 to the rights of persons that actually overlap 
with them rather than with those with whom they shall overlap eventually. Since these 
rights belong necessarily to members of G2 at t1, the interests of G3 are relevant only as 
present interests of G2. 
Such normative relations can even be grounded on actual self-interest and the 
fact that they might benefit persons who will live in the (proximate or remote) future is 
somehow contingent. This present-rights-of-present-persons view is hence more 
suitable for the legal and political realms, where policies and law-making are actually 
more concerned with present addressees and short term (often electoral) effects. 
This view may seem extremely minimalist but it is able to (i) embrace the non-
identity challenge, (ii) preserve rights-language in the intergenerational context, and (iii) 
consider the existence of present binding rights that include the preservation of truth 
value in the future, that is, rights that preserve the value of X ongoing from t1 to t2. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The argument presented here identified the main challenges posed by the NIP to 
the rights of future persons, and tried to demonstrate that its inherent notion of 
correlativity between rights and duties makes it invulnerable to the attacks to which it 
has been subjected over the last years. The most reasonable reaction to the NIP’s 
persuasion with regard to the rights of future persons remains embracing it as a problem 
that can be overcome only by restricting rights to relations between temporally-
overlapping persons. 
At first glance, this solution does not seem to satisfy the intuitions of those many 
observers who assume that persons existing in the present should care for members of 
future generations even if there were no generational overlap. Moreover, sceptics may 
inquire: How is this solution helpful in assorting the contents of X in cases where the 
consequences of present actions or policies are very remote? For instance, in 




choosing at t1 between a short-term favourable policy that will likely kill thousands of 
persons 300 years later or a short-term less favourable policy that will kill nobody; in 
choosing at t1 between a policy of conservation of resources or a policy of depletion? 
However, the proposed solution entails neither disregarding the interests of near and 
distant future persons nor dismissing the importance of long timeframes for certain 
moral problems. The point of the argument is that small normative steps lead less 
problematically to where large normative steps would lead us. Each person born at t1 
who becomes a duty-bearer at t1’ is engaged in normative relations that protect her and 
other right-holders at each moment, including her interests in persevering in the 
succeeding moment. There is no futurity here except as a broader conception of the 
present encompassing continuity and actuality – that is, a semi-future.20 
This does not mean necessarily that the immediacy of X involves disregard for a 
remote state of affairs, as long as the foresight of such a state of affairs is relevant to the 
bindingness of X in the present. The precise moments in the future in which something 
bad might occur that was predicted earlier (being exposed to other people’s toxic waste; 
dying of a disaster caused by an unstoppable event caused 300 years earlier; depletion 
of resources) are generally unknown and uncertain; from the viewpoint of a member of 
G1 at t1, it is possible that it might occur during a moment in which those with a claim 
to X at t1 overlap with right-holders not living at t1, which means that such a possibility 
is already relevant to the contents of X at t1.  
Ultimately, the road to recognizing the rights of future persons leads to a dead 
end. Yet, attention paid to the semi-future nature of the present rights of present persons 
contributes to the process of opening a path, even if a narrow one, towards protecting 
the interests of who will come to live. 
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1
 Parfit relies upon a form of Kripkean ‘geneticism’, where our identities are understood in terms of the 
necessity of our genetic origins (Kripke 1980, 113–15). 
2
 This view directs the NIP very close to presentism (according to which only present objects actually 
exist) due to the fact that it makes no assumptions about the (non)existence of future individuals qua 
individuals but only qua future individuals. This distinctive detail, however, can make way for eternalist 
alternatives to presentism (Griffith 2017), if surpassed. In addition, the Growing Block theory of time, 
according to which the past and present exist and the future does not exist, also seems compatible with the 
NIP. But since the NIP’s main point involves an argument about the normative relations between a 
present moment and a future moment, it does not seem to rely on any metaphysical assumption about the 
existential status of the past. 
3
 For broad actualism, see Quine (1948). For modal realism, which reformulates Diodorus Cronus’ classic 
Master Argument, see Lewis (1973; 1986). 
4
 The NIP’s possibilism requires a comparison between an actual state of affairs and possible 
counterfactual states of affairs belonging to worlds which are generally similar. In modal metaphysics, 
this can best be described in the possible-worlds semantics as closer either to Ersatzism (according to 
which the truth or falsity of a modal statement is explained by appeal to surrogates for possible worlds, 
rather than to genuinely existing worlds themselves), to fictionalism (according to which possible worlds 
have truth-values similar to the specific truth-values of fiction), or to some form of argument in-between 
both (Armstrong 1989). 
5
 There are two ways to sustain this claim. The first is the ‘concessional view’ (Elliot 1989; Schlossberger 
2008), also called ‘the meinongian view (Routley and Routley 1977): it states that rights exist presently 
without a bearer because they correlate with present duties, and its present existence is contingent on the 
future existence of some person who will then be the bearer of the right, which does not imply that the 
future person is the present bearer of the right. The second is the ‘constitutive view’: it states that a certain 
course of action might involve the creation of rights that would probably be violated in the future; a 
present action that may be a cause for a legitimate complaint is constitutive of a right whose binding force 
does not depend merely upon possible people – the morally wrongful act generates a new right that might 
be violated eventually (Sterba 1980; Woodward 1986; Smolkin 1999). Rather than considering rights the 
grounds for duties, this second strategy reverses the perspective insofar as duties are directed to person A 
if its purpose gives A a certain special place – the right is a normative consequence rather than the 
justification for such a consequence. 
6
 According to eternalism, the nonexistence argument inherent in the NIP can be surpassed since cross-
temporal normative relations are perfectly intelligible within such a frame of reference in the light of the 
claim that objects exist tenselessly, that is, they exist at the times they do in exactly the same manner that 
objects existing at this moment do (Griffith 2017). Thus, change takes place within time but time itself 




                                                                                                                                                                          
its own viewpoint, no moment is just absolutely present. Future persons exist and are no less real or actual 
due to the fact that they are future, and so eternalists might hold that future persons have rights at the 
times at which they exist and that those rights might be correlative with duties that exist at different times, 
as well as satisfied at the time at which the correlative duty is had. For an opposition to eternalism in the 
context of the NIP, see Earl (2011). 
7
 The ongoing debate on the possibility of representatives or ombuspersons for future people, especially 
before courts (Ekeli 2006) or policymakers (Beyleveld at al. 2015), presents a challenge to the present-
rights-of-future-persons view in the sense that representatives can be said to count as replacement rights-
holders for future persons. However, this hypothesis seems to put too much weight on the already 
inherently difficult and ambiguous concept of representation since it seems to imply that the contents of 
the representatives’ mandate not only includes rights rather than duties, but also includes the actualization 
of nonexistents, when in fact representatives actualize diffuse claim-rights rather than actual persons. That 
is why even those observers that talk about representation within this framework often resort to such 
abstractions as generic rights (Beyleveld et al. 2015). Strictly speaking, present representatives are not 
rights-holders – as the term suggests, they represent the genuine (future) rights-holders. 
8
 Supposing that a future individual A with a specific genetic heritage exists only in one possible world, 
modal realism claims that there is a suitable counterpart for A in some other possible world that does not 
rely strictly on genetic identity but rather on similarity. According to counterpart theory, the future 
individual may be represented in absentia at other worlds: other possible worlds can have a flesh-and-
blood counterpart of A, someone very like A in her origins and in her character; those worlds represent de 
re, concerning A, that she exists and does thus-and-so (Lewis 1986, 194). Individual A can satisfy the 
person-affecting conception of harm by comparing her (violated) right not with nonexistent rights but 
with the (unviolated) rights of her relevant counterparts. The advantage of this argument is that she no 
longer has to measure violation of her rights against nonexistence – her right exists in her world and can 
be compared with other existing rights in other possible worlds. 
9
 Even in accordance with the Thin-red-line thesis (according to which at any moment of time, including 
counterfactual moments, there is a true future passing through that moment, that is, a privileged branch 
related to actuality) (Belnap and Green 1994), it is not sufficient for the model to specify a preferred 
branch; it must also be assumed that there is a preferred branch at every counterfactual moment, that is, 
not only at W, but at all other worlds. Only a function that might give the true future for any moment of 
time at any possible world could resist the temptation to refer to a wait-and-see status of the privileged 
branch from the viewpoint of t1. 
10
 On logical equivalence, cf. Carnap (1956, 11). 
11
 This is also Aristotle’s version of correlativity, for whom a relative always has its relational correlative. 
A wing and a bird are not reciprocally correlatives because there are winged animals that are not birds: 
similarly, head and animal are not correlatives, but head and headed. See Aristotle (2002), Categories 
6b28-7b34. 
12




                                                                                                                                                                          
13
 ‘Hypothetically actual’ is Luís de Molina’s description of what he calls futurabilia, the future 
contingents, in his Concordia liberi arbitrii. Bertrand de Jouvenel’s later description of futuribles is as 
follows: ‘A futurible is a futurum that appears to the mind as a possible descendant from the present state 
of affairs’ (Jouvenel 1967, 18). 
14
 I must thank an anonymous reviewer of this paper for suggesting that humanity as a whole can be 
considered the relevant collective in this context; for instance, when invoking ‘the rights of humanity’ in 
order to include future persons. However, within such a framework, humanity as a whole can hardly be 
considered a collective entity in the sense of having a sufficient unity that deems it capable of becoming a 
right-holder vis-à-vis particular duty-bearers that are also members of humanity. We can use the term 
‘humanity’ to qualify a collection of humans, but if this collection is to involve future (possible) humans 
it must be a general type. And so it must be included in the discussion about types and tokens (which it 
is). Even Kant’s broad use of the expression ‘right of humanity’ refers to the innate right of humanity in 
one’s own person, to ‘the original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity’ (Kant 1996, 
393), that is, to how person-tokens have rights in reason of their participation in the person-type. 
15
 For the opposite view, according to which wronging can be separated from harming, see Kumar (2003). 
16
 The opposite view interprets the principle of linear identity only circumstantially. One way of 
providing such an interpretation is to claim that relevant person-affecting present actions are those not 
only likely but necessary conditions of the existence of future persons (Roberts 1998). This entails taking 
the NIP seriously but without necessarily extending its scope to all our present actions, but only to those 
that are the direct cause of one’s particular genetic identity. A second way of providing such an 
interpretation is to reject that present actions can affect the identities of all future persons; rather, linearity 
between present actions and particular identities might extend only to some specific persons (Carter 
2001). In either case, not all present actions are potentially limitative of the particular existence of future 
rights, even if the NIP remains sound in specific circumstances. 
17
 For a similarly unsatisfactory account of the worse-off argument, see Morriem (1988); Woollard 
(2012). More recently, Hanser (2011) has tried to develop an event-based account of harm independent of 
alternatives and outcomes. 
18
 See, for instance, the Argentinian Constitution, art. 41, §1; the Norwegian Constitution, art. L 110b, al. 
1; the Japanese Constitution, art. 11; the Bolivian Constitution, art. 7(m); and the Pennsylvanian 
Constitution, art. 1, §27. 
19
 This is Parfit’s position when formulating Principle Q (Parfit 1987, 360). On a posthumously published 
work, however, he came to accept that the NIP could be overcome by what he called a ‘wide person-
affecting principle’, according to which one of two outcomes is worse if it benefits people less than the 
other outcome would have (Parfit 2017). Preference for impersonal principles can also be found in Brock 
(1995); Buchanan et al. (2000); Page (2006); and Sanklecha (2017). For a theistically-based account of 
impersonal moral principles, see Reichenbach (1992). 
20
 Medieval visions of hell depicted it often as the continuous repetition of the present: see St. Augustine 
(2003, Bk. XXI, 9). Such a moral reproach of the present is also reflected in the notion of long durée 




                                                                                                                                                                          
of events, but as a principle of restlessness existing beneath the constantly moving conjunctures (Braudel 
1958). However, semi-future conceptions of the present entail considering each partial moment of 
duration a sort of mirror reflection of the set of infinite moments to come. 
